Multiparty signature protocols need protection against rogue-key attacks, made possible whenever an adversary can choose its public key(s) arbitrarily. For many schemes, provable security has only been established under the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption where the adversary is required to reveal the secret keys it utilizes. In practice, certifying authorities rarely require the strong proofs of knowledge of secret keys required to substantiate the KOSK assumption. Instead, proofs of possession (POPs) are required and can be as simple as just a signature over the certificate request message. We propose a general registered key model, within which we can model both the KOSK assumption and in-use POP protocols. We show that simple POP protocols yield provable security of Boldyreva's multisignature scheme [11] , the LOSSW multisignature scheme [28] , and a 2-user ring signature scheme due to Bender, Katz, and Morselli [10] . Our results are the first to provide formal evidence that POPs can stop rogue-key attacks.
Introduction
We refer to any scheme that generates signatures bound to a group of parties as a multiparty signature scheme. We focus on schemes that are both adaptive and decentralized: the set of potential signers is dynamic and no group manager is directly involved in establishing eligibility of participants. Examples include multisignatures, ring signatures, designated-verifier signatures, and aggregate signatures. These schemes require special care against rogue-key attacks, which can be mounted whenever adversaries are allowed to choose their public keys arbitrarily. Typical attacks have the adversary use a public key that is a function of an honest user's key, allowing him to produce forgeries easily. Rogue-key attacks have plagued the development of multiparty signature schemes [26, 20, 22, 30, 32, 33, 25, 11, 28, 37, 31] .
One method for preventing rogue-key attacks is to require, during public key registration with a certificate authority (CA), that a party proves knowledge of its secret key. This setting has typically been formalized as the knowledge of secret key (KOSK) assumption [11] : schemes are analyzed in a setting where adversaries must reveal their secret keys directly. This abstraction has lead to simple schemes and straightforward proofs of security. To name a few: Boldyreva's multisignature scheme [11] (we call it BMS), the LOSSW multisignature scheme [28] (we call it WMS for brevity and its basis on Waters signatures [39] ), the LOSSW sequential aggregate signature scheme [28] , and many designated-verifier signature schemes [23, 38, 27, 24] . Since simple rogue-key attacks against these schemes are known, it might appear that the security of these schemes actually depends on parties performing proofs of knowledge during registration.
Drawbacks of the KOSK assumption. Unfortunately, there are substantial drawbacks to using the KOSK assumption. Bellare and Neven discuss this in detail [7] ; we briefly recall some of their discussion. First and foremost, the KOSK assumption is not realized by existing public key infrastructures (PKI). Registration protocols specified by the most widely used standards (RSA PKCS#10 [35] , RFC 4210 [1] , RFC 4211 [36] ) do not specify that CA's should require proofs of knowledge. Thus, to use schemes proven secure under the KOSK assumption, one would be faced with the daunting task of upgrading existing (and already complex) PKI. This would likely require implementing clients and CA's that support zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs of knowledge that have extraction guarantees in fully concurrent settings [4] . Non-interactive ZK proofs of knowledge [17, 16, 19] could also be utilized, but these are more computationally expensive.
The plain setting. In the context of multisignatures, Bellare and Neven [7] show that it is possible to dispense with the KOSK assumption. They provide a multisignature scheme which is secure, even against rogue-key attacks, in the plain public-key setting, where registration with a CA ensures nothing about a party's possession or knowledge of a secret key. In this paper we are interested in something different, namely investigating the security of schemes (that are not secure in the plain setting) under more realistic key registration protocols, discussed next.
Proofs of possession. Although existing PKIs do not require proofs of knowledge, standards mandate the inclusion of a proof of possession (POP) during registration. A POP attests that a party has access to the secret key associated with his/her public key, which is typically accomplished using the functionality of the key pair's intended scheme. For signature schemes, the simplest POP has a party sign its certificate request message and send both the message and signature to the CA. The CA checks that the signature verifies under the public key being registered. In general, such proofs of possession (POPs) are clearly not sufficient for substantiating the KOSK assumption. In fact, POPs have not (previously) lead to any formal guarantees of security against rogue key attacks, even though intuitively they might appear to stop adversaries from picking arbitrary public keys. This logical gap has contributed to contention regarding the need for POPs in PKI standards [2] .
Our contributions. We suggest analyzing the security of multiparty signature schemes in a registered key model, which allows modeling a variety of key registration assumptions including those based on POPs. Using the new model, we analyze the security of the BMS and WMS multisignature schemes under POP protocols. We show that, interestingly, requiring the in-use and standardized POP protocol described above still admits rogue-key attacks. This implies the intuition mentioned above is flawed. On the positive side, we show how a slight change to the standardized POP protocol admits proofs of security for these schemes. We also investigate the setting of ring signatures. We describe how the key registration model can be utilized to result in improved unforgeability guarantees. In particular we show that the Bender, Katz, and Morselli 2-user ring signature scheme based on Waters signatures [10] is secure against rogue-key attacks under a simple POP protocol. We now look at each of these contributions in more detail.
The registered key model. A key registration protocol is a pair of interactive algorithms (RegP, RegV), the former executed by a registrant and the latter executed by a certifying authority (CA). We lift security definitions to the registered key model by giving adversaries an additional key registration oracle, which, when invoked, executes a new instance of RegV. The security game can then restrict adversarial behavior based on whether successful registration has occurred. Security definitions in the registered key model are thus parameterized by a registration protocol. This approach allows us to straightforwardly model a variety of registration assumptions, including the KOSK assumption, the plain setting and POP-based protocols.
Multisignatures under POP. A multisignature scheme allows a set of parties to jointly generate a compact signature for some message. These schemes have numerous applications, e.g. contract signing, distribution of a certificate authority, or co-signing. The BMS and WMS schemes are simple multisignature schemes that are based directly on the short signature schemes of Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS) [14] and Waters [39] . (That is, a multisignature with group of size one is simply a BLS or Waters signature.) These schemes give short multisignatures (just 160 bits for BMS). Moreover, multisignature generation is straightforward: each party produces its BLS or Waters signature on the message, and the multisignature is just the (component-wise) product of these signatures. Both schemes fall prey to straightforward rogue-key attacks, but have proofs of security under the KOSK assumption [11, 28] .
We analyze these schemes when key registration requires POPs. We show that the standardized POP mechanism described above, when applied to these schemes, does not lead to secure multisignatures. Both schemes fall to rogue-key attacks despite the use of the standardized POPs. We present a straightforward and natural fix for this problem: simply use separate hash functions for POPs and multisignatures. We prove the security of BMS and WMS multisignatures under such POP mechanisms, giving the first formal justification that these desirable schemes can be used in practice. Both proofs reduce to the same computational assumptions used in previous KOSK proofs and the reductions are just as tight.
Ring signatures under POP. Ring signatures allow a signer to choose a group of public keys and sign a message so that it is verifiable that some party in the group signed it, but no adversary can determine which party it was. The canonical application of ring signatures is leaking secrets [34] . Bender, Katz, and Morselli (BKM) have given a hierarchy of anonymity and unforgeability definitions for ring signature schemes [10] . For κ-user schemes, where only rings of size κ are allowed, we point out that the ability to mount rogue-key attacks (as opposed to the ability to corrupt honest parties) is a crucial distinguisher of the strength of unforgeability definitions. We introduce new security definitions that facilitate a formal analysis of this fact. BKM also propose two 2-user ring signature schemes that do not rely on random oracles, and prove them to meet the weaker unforgeability guarantee. As pointed out by Shacham and Waters, these schemes do not meet the stronger definition due to rogue-key attacks [37] .
We show that the KOSK assumption provably protects against rogue-key attacks for a natural class of ring signature schemes (both the BKM 2-user schemes fall into this class). We go on to prove the security of the BKM 2-user scheme based on Waters signatures under a simple POP-based registration protocol.
Schemes in the plain setting. We briefly overview some schemes built for the plain setting. The Micali, Ohta, and Reyzin multisignature scheme [31] was the first to be proven secure in the plain setting, but it requires a dedicated key setup phase after which the set of potential signers is necessarily static. The multisignature scheme of Bellare and Neven [7] does not require a key setup phase, and is proven secure in the plain setting. While computationally efficient, it requires several rounds of communication between all co-signers, which is more than the "non-interactive" BMS and WMS schemes.
Bender, Katz, and Morselli introduced the first ad-hoc ring signature scheme that provably resists rogue-key attacks [10] . Their scheme is not efficient, requiring semantically-secure encryption for each bit of a message. The ring signature scheme of Shacham and Waters [37] is more efficient but still not as efficient as the BKM schemes for rings of size two. Particularly, their ring signatures are at least three times as long as those given by the BKM scheme based on Waters signatures and they require more computational overhead. Of course, their solution works on rings with size greater than two.
Finally, aggregate signature schemes due to Boneh et al. [13] and Lysyanskaya et al. [29] are secure in the plain setting.
Related work and open problems. Boldyreva et al. [12] investigate certified encryption and signature schemes. They utilize a POP-based protocol to show the security of traditional certified signatures. They do not consider multiparty signatures. Many schemes beyond those treated here rely on the KOSK assumption and finding POP-based protocols for such schemes, if possible, constitutes an important set of open problems. A few examples are the LOSSW sequential aggregate signature scheme [28] , the StKD encryption scheme due to Bellare, Kohno, and Shoup [5] , and various designated-verifier signature schemes [23, 38, 27, 24] .
Preliminaries
Basic notation. For a set S, we write P κ (S) to mean the set of all subsets of size κ that exist in S. A multiset S is a set that allows multiple copies of elements. The size of a multiset is denoted |S|. We write Multiset union S 1 ∪ S 2 combines two multisets, including any duplicates. Thus,
We write S ∪ ← s to add (another copy of) s to S, i.e. S ← S ∪ {s}. Multiset subtraction S − {s} denotes removing one instance of s from S. Multiset difference S 1 \S 2 results in the multiset formed by repeatedly executing S 1 − {s} for each s ∈ S 2 (note this is done once for each element, including duplicates). Multiset equality, containment, inequality, and intersection are defined in the natural ways. We abuse notation by using multiset notation also as boolean operators: "If S 1 ⊆ S 2 then" evaluates the statement following 'then' if S 1 is a subset of S 2 and does not otherwise. Other boolean multiset-operators are defined in the natural way.
We define s Bilinear maps and co-CDH. The schemes we consider use bilinear maps. Let G 1 , G 2 , and G T be groups, each of prime order p. Then G * 1 , G * 2 , and G * T represent the set of all generators of the groups (respectively). Let e: G 1 ×G 2 → G T be an efficiently computable bilinear map (also called a pairing). For the multisignature schemes we consider, we use the asymmetric setting [14, 13] where G 1 = G 2 and there exists an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ: G 2 → G 1 . The asymmetry allows for short signatures, while ψ is needed in the proofs. For the ring signature schemes we consider, we instead use the symmetric setting [10, 37] where G 1 = G 2 . Let n represent the number of bits needed to encode an element of G 1 ; for the asymmetric setting n is typically 160. Finally let g be a generator in G 2 . For the rest of the paper we treat G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, g, e as fixed, globally known parameters. Then we define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem in the groups (G 1 , G 2 ) as
where the probability is over the random choices of x and h and the coins used by A. Here Z p is the set of integers modulo p. Note that in the symmetric setting this is just the CDH problem. For a group element g, we write g to mean some canonical encoding of g as a bit string of the appropriate length. We write g n to mean the first n bits of g . We use the shorthand u (resp. w) to mean a list of group elements u 1 , . . . , u n (resp. w 1 , . . . , w n ). Let t E , t ψ , and t e be the maximum times to compute an exponentiation in G 1 , compute ψ on an element in G 2 , and compute the pairing.
Signature schemes. A signature scheme S = (Pg, Kg, Sign, Ver) consists of an parameter generation algorithm, a key generation algorithm, a signing algorithm that outputs a signature given a secret key and a message, and a verification algorithm that outputs a bit given a public key, message, and signature. If Pg is omitted, this means there are no public parameters requiring trusted setup; in this case the implicit Pg algorithm just outputs an empty string. We require that Ver(pk, M, Sign(sk, M )) = 1 for all allowed M and valid pk, sk. Following [18] , we define the advantage of an adversary A in forging against S in a chosen message attack as
where the probability is over the coins used by Kg, Sign, and A. We only consider adversaries that output forgeries on a message M which was not queried to the oracle.
The Registered Key Model
Key registration protocols. Let P and S be sets and K ⊆ P × S be a relation on the sets (representing public keys, secret keys, and valid key pairs, respectively). A key registration protocol is a pair of interactive algorithms (RegP, RegV). A party registering a key runs RegP with inputs pk ∈ P and sk ∈ S. A certifying authority (CA) runs RegV. We restrict our attention (without loss of generality) to protocols in which the last message is from RegV to RegP and contains either a pk ∈ P or a distinguished symbol ⊥. We require that running RegP(pk, sk) with RegV results in RegV's final message being pk whenever (pk, sk) ∈ K. We give several examples of key registration protocols. The plain registration protocol Plain = (PlainP, PlainV) has the registrant running PlainP(pk, sk) send pk to the CA. The CA running PlainV, upon receiving a public key pk, simply replies with pk. This protocol will be used to capture the plain model, where no checks on public keys are performed by a CA. To model the KOSK assumption, we specify the registration protocol Kosk = (KoskP, KoskV). Here KoskP(pk, sk) sends (pk, sk) to the CA. Upon receiving (pk, sk), the KoskV algorithm checks that (pk, sk) ∈ K. (We assume that such a check is efficiently computable; this is the case for key pairs we consider.) If so, it replies with pk and otherwise with ⊥.
We refer to registration protocols that utilize the key's intended functionality as proof-ofpossession based. For example, let S = (Kg, Sign, Ver) be a signature scheme. Define the registration protocol S-Pop = (PopP, PopV) as follows. Running PopP on inputs pk, sk results in sending the message pk || Sign(sk, pk ) to the CA. Upon receiving message pk || σ, a CA running PopV replies with pk if Ver(pk, pk , σ) = 1 and otherwise replies with ⊥. This corresponds to the simplest POPs for signature schemes specified in PKCS#10 and RFCs 4210/4211. The registered key model. We consider security definitions that are captured by a game between an adversary and an environment. To lift such security definitions to the registered key model, we use the following general approach. Adversaries are given an additional key registration oracle OKReg that, once invoked, runs a new instance of RegV for some key registration protocol (RegP, RegV). If the last message from RegV is a public key pk, then pk is added to a table R. This table can now be used to modify winning conditions or restrict which public keys are utilized by the adversary in interactions with the environment. Security of schemes under the new definition is therefore always with respect to some registration protocol.
The key registration protocols mentioned so far are two round protocols: the registrant sends a first message to the CA, which replies with a second message being either pk or ⊥. For any two round protocol Reg = (RegP, RegV), the OKReg oracle can be simplified as follows. An adversary queries with a first message, at which point RegP is immediately run and supplied with the message. The oracle halts RegP before it sends its reply message. The message is added to R if it is not ⊥. The oracle finally returns pk or ⊥ appropriately.
Multisignatures using POPs
The goal of a multisignature scheme is for a group of parties, each with its own public and secret keys, to jointly create a compact signature on some message. Following the formulation in [7] , a multisignature scheme is a tuple of algorithms MS = (MPg, MKg, MSign, MVf). A trusted central authority runs the parameter generation algorithm MPg to create a parameter string par that is published globally. The key generation algorithm MKg, independently run by each party, outputs a key pair (pk, sk). The MSign interactive protocol is run by some group of players. Each party locally runs MSign on input being a secret key sk, a multiset of public keys V, and a message M . It may consist of multiple rounds, though the protocols we consider here only require a single round: a request broadcast to all parties and the response(s). Finally, the verification algorithm MVf takes as input a tuple (V, M, σ), where V is a multiset of public keys, M is a message, and σ is a signature, and returns a bit. We require that MVf(V, M, MSign(sk, V, M )) = 1 for any M and where every participant correctly follows the algorithms. For schemes that do not require any trusted setup, we write the scheme as just a triple of algorithms (MKg, MSign, MVf) where the now implicit MPg algorithm returns an empty string.
Multisignature security. Let MS = (MPg, MKg, MSign, MVf) be a multisignature scheme, Reg = (RegP, RegV) be a key registration protocol, and A be an adversary. Figure 1 A halts with output (V, M, σ) satisfies the following four conditions. First, the honest public key pk * is in the multiset V at least once. Second, the message M was not queried to the multisignature oracle. Third, the signature verifies. Fourth, each public key in V − {pk * } must be in R, where V − {pk * } means the multiset V with one occurrence of the honest key removed. We define the msuf-kr-advantage of an adversary A against a multisignature scheme MS with respect to registration protocol Reg as Adv
The probability is taken over the random coins used in the course of running the experiment, including those used by A. The definitions can be lifted to the random oracle model [8] in the natural way. It is easy to show that our definition is equivalent to the definition in [7] when Reg = Plain and equivalent to the definition in [11] when Reg = Kosk.
An adversary A is legitimate if: (1) it only queries OMSign on a set of public keys V such that pk * ∈ V; and (2) outputs a forgery attempt (V, M, σ) for which pk * ∈ V and M / ∈ Q and (V − {pk * })\R = ∅ (all adversarially-chosen keys have been previously registered). Without loss of generality, we will from now on only consider legitimate adversaries.
We now prove the security of the BMS and WMS multisignature schemes relative to POP-based protocols that differ from current standards only by use of a distinct hash function. In Section 4.3 we discuss attacks against the schemes when standardized registration protocols are utilized.
Multisignatures Based on BLS Signatures
BLS signatures and multisignatures. Let H s : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a random oracle and let G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, g, e be pairing parameters. Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham [14] specify a signature scheme BLS = (B-Kg, B-Sign, B-Vf). The algorithms work as follows:
The BMS = (B-MKg, B-MSign, B-MVf) multisignature scheme [11] is a simple extension of BLS signatures. Key generation is equivalent to B-Kg. Multisignature generation for participants labeled 1, . . . , v, public keys V = {pk 1 , . . . , pk v }, and a message M proceeds as follows. Each participant i computes σ i $ ← B-Sign(sk i , M ) and broadcasts σ i to all other participants. The multisignature is
then runs B-Vf
Hs (P K, M, σ), returning its output. Boldyreva proved the scheme secure under the KOSK assumption [11] .
The B-Pop protocol. We now specify a POP-based key registration protocol under which we can prove BMS secure. Let H p : {0, 1} * → G 1 be a random oracle. Then we define the B-Pop = (B-PopP, B-PopV) protocol as follows. Algorithm B-PopP(pk, sk) sends pk || B-Sign Hp (sk, pk ) and algorithm B-PopV, upon receiving (pk, π) computes B-Vf Hp (pk, pk , π) and if the result is 1 replies with pk and otherwise with ⊥. We point out that one can use the same random oracle (and underlying instantiating hash function) for both H s and H p as long as domain separation is enforced. The following theorem captures the security of BMS with respect to this key registration protocol. Theorem 4.1 Let H s , H p : {0, 1} * → G 1 be random oracles. Let A be an msuf-kr-adversary, with respect to the B-Pop propocol, that runs in time t, makes q h , q pop , q s , and q k queries to H s , H p , the signing oracle, and the key registration oracle, and outputs a multisignature forgery on a group of size at most v. Then there exists an adversary B such that
where B runs in time at most t + O((q h + q pop + v)t E + t e ).
Proof: We construct a co-CDH adversary B, which on input X ∈ G 2 and h ∈ G 1 utilizes a legitimate msuf-kr adversary A (with respect to the B-Pop protocol) to help it compute h x where x = log g X. We adapt a game-playing [9] approach due to Bellare for proving the security of BLS signatures [3] . Recall that since BMS is a single-round protocol the signing oracle simply returns a BLS signature over the message. We make several simplifying assumptions about A that are without loss of generality. First, A always queries H s (M ) before querying OMSign(M ) for any message M . Second, A always queries H p ( pk ) before querying OKReg(pk, π) for any π. Third, A only queries OKReg on pairs (pk, π) for which B-Vf Hp (pk, pk , π) = 1. Figure 2 details the adversary B. It first applies the isomorphism ψ to g and X and sets a counter c to zero. It runs A on input X, which is then the trusted public key of the BMS instance A is to attack. Adversary B uses four tables, H s , H p , B, and P. All four are initially everywhere undefined. Queries to H s are sometimes responded to with values that include h and sometimes not, depending on a δ-biased coin (we notate flipping such a coin by δ c δ ← {0, 1}). Intuitively, the δ c values correspond to guessing which H s query will correspond to the forgery message. Adversary B responds to H p queries with values that always include h. This is so that the adversarially-supplied POPs can be used to help extract the co-CDH solution from a forgery. Queries to OKReg simply record the supplied POP in P. Eventually A halts outputing a forgery attempt (V, M, σ). Adversary B checks if the forgery verifies and if so attempts to extract from it the value h x . Here (X, pk 1 , . . . , pk d ) ← V means parse V into the sequence of public keys X, pk 1 , . . . , pk d which enumerates all those in V. (Since A is legitimate X must be in V.) Note that extraction of h x is only possible if the forgery message had its H s response programmed to include h.
We now proceed through a sequence of games to lower bound the probability that B succeeds in computing h x . The first game is G0, shown in Figure 2 with boxed statements omitted. It is exactly like B except that it generates the co-CDH instance itself (first line of Initialize). The outputs G0(A) and B are thus distributed identically. More-over, if their output is not ⊥ then it is h x . To see this, let us fix some notation related to the variables in the Finalize procedure of G0. Define sk i = log g pk i and Figure 2 : Adversary B and games G0 and G1 used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Game G0 omits the boxed statements while G1 includes them.
Applying the properties of pairings to these equivalences gives that σ = (hg α 1 ) x+sk 1 +...+sk d and π i = (hg
Therefore we have that
The next game is G1, shown in Figure 2 with the boxed statements included. Games G0 and G1
procedure Initialize
procedure OKReg(pk, π) are identical-until-bad. Let Good i be the event that Gi(A) does not set bad. Then by a variant [6] of the fundamental lemma of game-playing [9] we have that
In game G1 note that signing queries always return H s [M ] x . This is true because
Additionally Finalize, as per (1), always returns h x if A's forgery verifies. Game G2 rewrites OMSign and Finalize to make these facts explicit, and also omits computing g 1 and X 1 which are no longer needed. We have that
In game G2 all uses of hash range points are via H s [M ] and H p [M ] (i.e., we no longer utilize the special structure of the range points). Game G3 therefore dispenses with the special way in which H s and H p choose range points, now choosing them directly at random from G 1 . In both G2 and G3 the range points have the same (uniform) distribution, meaning that the code is equivalent and thus
In G3 the setting of bad does not impact any other random variables in the game, and so in game G4 we defer its setting until Finalize. Furthermore, not all of the δ values can actually set bad: only those that end up being referenced during signing queries and the one extra for the forgery. Thus G4 moves incrementing the counter c to signing queries, and in Finalize only performs δ-biased coin tosses c + 1 times: one for each signature query and one for the forgery. This justifies that
In game G4, the event G4(A) ⊥ and the event Good 4 are independent. This is because the events do not rely on any shared random variables. The variable c is in fact not a random variable, because it will always equal q s , the number of signing queries A uses. This justifies that
where Pr [Good 4 ] ≥ (e(q s + 1)) −1 (this is standard, see e.g. [6, 15] ). Finally, G4 exactly simulates for A the ruf3-kr experiment, meaning
Combining (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and the lower bound on Pr [Good 4 ] yields
which implies the theorem statement. Adversary B runs A. Additionally B must perform an exponentiation for each H s and H p query and one for each key in the forgery set V. Finally B must perform a pairing to verify the forgery. Thus B runs in time at most t + O((q h + q pop + v)t E + t e ) where |V| = v.
Multisignatures Based on Waters Signatures
Waters signatures and multisignatures. Let G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, g, e be pairing parameters. We define the signature scheme W = (W-Pg, W-Kg, W-Sign, W-Vf), as given in [28] and which is a slight variant of the original Waters signature scheme in [39] . The parameter generation algorithm
and publishes them globally. The other algorithms are defined below.
For simplicity the message space as defined is restricted to {0, 1} n , but in practice one can use a collision-resistant hash function to expand the domain.
The WMS = (W-Pg, W-MKg, W-MSign, W-MVf) multisignature scheme [28] is a straightforward extension of the Waters' signature scheme. Parameter generation and key generation are the same as in W. To generate a multisignature for multiset V = {pk 1 , . . . , pk v }, each participant i computes
To verify a multisignature (σ, ρ) for a message M and public keys V = {pk 1 , . . . , pk v }, simply let
). This scheme was proven secure using the KOSK assumption in [28] .
be global parameters with associated hash function H w, w . These parameters require trusted setup, particularly because the CA should not know their discrete logs. (One might therefore have the trusted party that runs W-Pg also generate w, w.) We define the following key registration protocol WM-Pop = (WM-PopP, WM-PopV): Algorithm WM-PopP takes as input (pk, sk) and sends pk || (π, ) where (π, ) = W-Sign H w, w (sk, pk n ). Algorithm WM-PopV receives pk || (π, ) and then runs W-Vf H w, w (pk, pk n , (π, )) and if the result is 1, replies with pk and else replies with ⊥. The following theorem combined with [28, Theorem 2] (security of WMS under the KOSK assumption) establishes the security of WMS under WM-Pop. and where B runs in time t + O(nt E + (t E + t ψ )q k ) and makes q s signature queries.
Proof: Let A be a legitimate adversary against WMS. Like in the proof for BMS, we note that for the scheme WMS, a multisignature session oracle is equivalent to a Waters signature signing oracle for the trusted party. We therefore deal with the latter, which is simpler.
We wish to construct an adversary B which uses A to create a forgery against the WMS multisignature scheme with the Kosk key registration protocol. Adversary B will receive as input system parameters (h, g, u, u 1 , . . . , u m ) and target public key pk * , where h is a generator of G 1 , u, u 1 , . . . , u m are all elements of G 1 , g is a generator of G 2 , and pk * = g α for some random α ∈ Z p . The adversary is also given a signing oracle OMSign-B and a key registration oracle OKReg-B. Its goal is to produce a valid multisignature forgery which verifies under some set of keys that includes pk * . Since A is an adversary against WMS with WM-Pop key registration, it must take additional input w, w (for key registration) and B must simulate for it a signing oracle OMSign-A and a key registration oracle OKReg-A. The adversary B operates as follows:
. Choose s $ ← Z p . Run the WMS multisignature adversary A on input pk = pk * , par = (h, g, u, u, w, w).
• On oracle query OMSign-A(M i ) from A, query OMSign-B(M i ). Upon receiving a signature (σ i , ρ i ), forward it back to A.
•
. Then query OKReg-B(pk i , sk i ).
• When A outputs an attempted forgery (V, M, (σ, ρ)), output (V, M, (σ, ρ) ).
We now show that whenever A forges against the WMS multisignature scheme with WM-Pop key registration, B forges against the WMS mulsignature scheme with Kosk key registration (WMS was proven secure under the KOSK assumption in [28] ). To do this we first claim that B perfectly simulates the environment for A. This is clear since the public key and system parameters given to A directly correspond to the public key and parameters given to B (namely h, g, u, u 1 , . . . , u n ) and thus the sign oracle provided by B is correct. Since B forwards all of A's sign oracle queries to the environment and B makes no other sign oracle queries, it is also clear that if A did not query its forgery message to the sign oracle provided by B, then B also did not query its sign oracle on that message. Lastly, we show that every time A sends a valid POP to the registration oracle provided by B, B is able to 'extract' the secret key to send to its own Kosk registration oracle. To see this recall that a valid POP (π i , i ) for key pk i is such that
Also, note that (pk i , sk i ) is a valid key pair if and only if e(sk i , g) = e(h, pk i ).
Now, rearranging equation 10:
which from equation 11 means that (pk i , sk i ) is a valid key pair. This shows that each time adversary A is able to register a key, B is able to 'extract' the corresponding secret key and use it for KOSK key registration. Now, whenever A forges, it must have properly registered the keys used in the forgery. Since we just showed that a proper key registration by A equates to a proper key registration for B, it follows that whenever A forges, B also forges. So,
WMS,Kosk (B). In addition to running A, B must must perform one isomorphism and n + 1 exponentiations before starting A, plus q k isomorphisms and q k exponentiations. Thus the running time of B is t + O(nt E + (t E + t ψ ) · q k ) where t is the running time of A.
Attacks against Standardized Key Registration Protocols
We show how the standardized proof-of-possession based key registration protocols (as per PKCS#10 [35] and RFCs 4210/4211 [1, 36] ) fail to prevent rogue key attacks. Let BadPop = (BadP, BadV) be the standardized key registration protocol for BMS and let the algorithms be as follows: Algorithm BadP, on input (pk, sk) sends pk || B-Sign H (sk, pk ) and algorithm BadV, upon receiving (pk, π), runs B-Vf H (pk, pk , π) and replies with pk if the result is 1 and ⊥ otherwise. Here H is the same hash function as used in B-MSign and B-MVf.
We define a simple msuf-kr adversary A that successfully mounts a rogue-key attack against BMS with respect to the BadPop registration protocol. Adversary A gets the honest party's public key pk * which is equal to g sk * . It then chooses s $ ← Z p . Its public key is set to pk = g s /pk * = g s−sk * . The forgery on any message M and multiset {pk * , pk} is simply H(M ) s , which clearly verifies under the two public keys given. Now to register its key, the adversary makes the query OMSign({pk * }, pk ), receiving σ = H( pk ) sk * . Then A sets π ← H( pk ) s /σ and registers with pk || π. It is easy to see that this verifies, and thus A can always output a multisignature forgery: its msuf-kr advantage is one.
An analogous key registration protocol could be defined for WMS, and again a simple attack shows its insecurity. Both approaches fall to attacks because the signatures used for key registration and normal multisignatures are calculated in the same manner. This motivated our simple deviations from standardized registration protocols for the B-Pop and WM-Pop protocols.
Other POP Variants
Another class of POP-based registration protocols for signature schemes has the CA send a random challenge to the registrant. The registrant must then supply a signature over the challenge message. Our results also apply to such protocols.
We first show that requiring a signature over a random challenge has the exact same pitfalls as requiring a signature of the key being registered. Let BadRCPop = (BadRCP, BadRCV) be a random challenge key registration protocol for BMS with its algorithms as follows: algorithm BadRCP, on input (pk, sk) sends pk to the CA; algorithm BadRCV receives pk and replies with a random string c ∈ {0, 1} n ; BadRCP receives c and replies with π = B-Sign H (sk, c); finally BadRCV receives π and outputs pk if B-Vf H (pk, c, π) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise. Hash function H is the same one used in B-MSign and B-MVf.
As before, there is a simple msuf-kr adversary A that can mount a rogue-key attack against BMS with this registration protocol. Adversary A gets the honest party's public key pk * which is equal to g sk * . It then chooses s $ ← Z p . Its public key is set to pk = g s /pk * = g s−sk * . The forgery on any message M and multiset {pk * , pk} is simply H(M ) s . To register its key, the adversary must sign some random challenge c with the rogue key. To do this, the adversary, upon receiving c, makes the query OMSign({pk * }, c) and receives σ = H(c) sk * . Then A sets π ← H(c) s /σ and sends π as its response.
To prevent the attack above, we again can use a distinct hash function for signing and key registration. To adapt the proof of Theorem 4.1 to the setting with random challenge key registration, the adversary B simply needs to compute γ i ← α − B[c i ], where c i is the random challenge given when pk i was registered. The rest of the proof is the same. The proof of Theorem 4.2 can be similarly modified. The reason that this works is that the proof of security does not depend on the choice of string signed in the proof of possession, as long as the string is known to the CA. 
Ring Signatures in the Registered Key Model
A ring signature scheme RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) consists of four algorithms. The parameter generation algorithm generates a parameter string par, which is published globally. The key generation algorithm RKg outputs a key pair (pk, sk). The algorithm RSign sk (V, M ) ≡ RSign(sk, V, M ) generates a ring signature on input a secret key sk, a message M, and a multiset of public keys V such that there exists pk ∈ V for which (pk, sk) is a valid key pair. We further assume that |V| ≥ 2. Note that we do not require that all elements in V be distinct. 1 Lastly the verification algorithm RVf(V, M, σ) outputs a bit. We require that RVf(V, M, RSign sk (V, M )) = 1 for any message M , any valid multiset of public keys, and for any valid sk with a pk ∈ V. Ring signatures that only allow rings of size exactly κ are called κ-user ring signatures.
Ring Signature Definitions
New anonymity definition. We propose a stronger definition of anonymity than those given by Bender et al. [10] . Intuitively, our definition requires that no adversary should be able to tell what secret key was used to generate a ring signature, even if the adversary itself chooses the secret keys involved. Formally, let A be an adversary and RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) be a ring signature scheme. Then we define the ranon-ind advantage of an adversary A by Figure 4 . We say a scheme is perfectly r-anonind anonymous if the advantage of any adversary is zero.
The ranon-ind definition is stronger than the strongest definition given in [10] (see Appendix A for details). Even so, it is easy to see that (for example) both of the 2-user ring signature schemes from [10] meet it, and are, in fact, perfectly ranon-ind anonymous.
Unforgeability definitions. We expand the unforgeability definitions given in [10] , drawing a distinction between attacks where honest parties can be corrupted and rogue-key attacks (where the adversary can choose public keys). We also lift the strongest unforgeability definition to the registered key model. Fix some number η, representing the number of trusted potential honest signers. Let RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) be a ring signature scheme and Reg = (RegP, RegV) be a registration protocol. Then we define the advantages 
. . , η} = ∅ ) then Ret 1 Ret 0 Figure 5 : Ring signature unforgeability experiment in the registered key model. The ruf2 experiment is derived by omitting the OKReg oracle. The ruf1 experiment is derived by omitting both the OKReg and OCorrupt oracles.
• Adv Figure 5 except both the OCorrupt and OKReg oracles are omitted. Note that we have not excluded the possibility that duplicate public keys are generated by the experiment 2 , and in particular V and S might both be multisets in the experiments. (This better reflects the independent nature of key generation by users, who cannot necessarily be trusted to ensure all public keys generated are unique.) On the other hand, P must not have duplicates.
We also define a variant of the ruf3-kr security definition, which pertains to fixed-ring adversaries. These are adversaries which must forge against some ring of public keys selected by the environment. Let ν ≥ 2 and assume that RS supports rings of size ν. Define the experiment Exp An adversary A is legitimate if: (1) all queries to ORSign(s, V, M ) are such that s ∈ {1, . . . , η}; pk s ∈ V; and (V \S)\R = ∅; (2) all queries to OCorrupt(i) are such that i ∈ {1, . . . , η} and A never repeats a query i to OCorrupt; and (3) A only outputs tuples (P, M, σ) for which P\{1, . . . , η} = ∅ (all indices in P are distinct and in the range [1 .. η]) and P ∩ C = ∅ and (V, M ) / ∈ Q. Without loss of generality, we will from now on only consider legitimate adversaries.
Unforgeability Implications for κ-user Schemes
In this section we focus on κ-user ring signature schemes, giving two results. The first is that for κ-user ring signatures meeting the ranon-ind anonymity definition, security against corruption attacks is implied by security against chosen subring attacks. This shows that (for these schemes) the ability to corrupt parties offers little benefit to adversaries. The second result shows that κ-user schemes secure against fixed-ring rogue-key attacks are also secure against general rogue-key attacks. Both results will be useful for establishing the security of schemes against rogue-key attacks when key registration protocols are utilized (as discussed in the next two sections). Additionally, the lemmas could be of independent interest.
Corruptions don't help. We now state and prove a lemma which states that the ability to corrupt parties is of limited usefulness to adversaries attacking κ-user ring signature schemes.
Lemma 5.1 Let RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) be a κ-user ring signature scheme. Let η ≥ κ. and let A be an ruf2 adversary that makes at most q s signature queries, at most q c corruption queries, and runs in time at most t. Then there exist adversaries B a and B u such that
where B a and B u uses at most q s queries and run in time at most t + O(q c + (q s + η + 1)Time(RS)).
Proof: Let A be a legitimate ruf2 adversary. We build a legitimate ruf1 adversary B u that uses A. See Figure 6 . The adversary B u is given inputs a parameter string and set of honestly-generated public keys and access to a signing oracle denoted by ORSign-1. Recall that this oracle, which corresponds to the ruf1 experiment, does not allow queries on adversarially-generated public keys. Adversary B u first selects a set of indices K that represent its guess of which parties will not be corrupted by A. Then, a new set of keys is generated by B u . For every index in K the real key is used. For all others, B u generates its own public key, secret key pair. Adversary A is run using the resulting multiset of public keys. (A is given a sequence of keys such that the ith key in the sequence corresponds to pk i ). Signing queries ORSign-2(s, V, M ) from A are simulated in one of two ways. If the keys in V correspond to the guessed subset, then B u utilizes its own oracle to respond. Otherwise, one of the keys that B u generated itself is used to answer the query. The statement "Let j ∈ [1 .. η]\K be s.t. pk j ∈ V" means find a (e.g., the first) key pk j that is both in V and in the set of public keys generated by B u . For corruption queries, if the index queried is not in K then the appropriate secret key is returned (in this case B generated the key itself). Otherwise ⊥ is returned. Note that by the legitimacy of A and the manner in which signing queries are handled B u is also legitimate. We now proceed through a game-playing sequence to lower bound the advantage of B u in terms of the advantage of A and, as we'll see, an ranon-ind adversary B a . Game G0 represents the first game, see Figure 6 . It is equivalent to the adversary B u except that it generates the parameter string and honest public keys itself and answers ORSign queries for the chosen set of public keys directly. Since the outputs of G0 and B u are distributed equivalently and B u forges anytime it doesn't output ⊥, we have Game G1 is shown in Figure 7 . It is the same as G0 except that we simplify the initialization procedure to just pick one set of η key pairs. The view of the adversary is equivalent, since all keys are distributed as before. Thus
Game G2 modifies the ORSign procedure of G1: in all cases the secret key associated with the index s is used to answer the response. Otherwise the games are identical. To bound the loss incurred by this game transition, we build an ranon-ind adversary B a . This adversary will have advantage related to the ability of A to force the output of G1(A) to differ from the output of G2(A). Figure 7 depicts the adversary. It utilizes its ORSignLR oracle to help answer A's ORSign-2 queries and returns a one whenever A's forgery is successful and bad is not set. We have that
Note that if B a is run in the ranon-ind-1 experiment, then the secret key sk s is always utilized to answer B a 's oracle queries. Thus B a returns a one whenever G2(A) does not output ⊥, and so we have that Pr Exp
Similarly, if B a is run in the ranon-ind-0 experiment, then the secret key sk j is always used to answer B a 's queries. So Pr Exp
. Substituting back into (14) and re-arranging we procedure Initialize
Adversary B a (par):
Figure 7: Games G1 and G2 and adversary B a used in the proof of Lemma 5.1. Game G2 utilizes the same Initialize, OCorrupt, and Finalize procedures as G1.
have that
Game G3 (Figure 8 , boxed statements omitted) simplifies the ORSign-2 oracle: the code is different but it implements the same functionality as in G2. As a result of this change, the game no longer requires T , thus we omit it from Initialize.
Let Good i be the event that Gi(A) does not set bad. Then we have by (16) that
Game G4 includes the boxed statements, which assist it in answering ORSign-2 queries and ensure that G4 only outputs ⊥ if A failed to produce a valid forgery. Games G3 and G4 are identicaluntil-bad. By a variant [6] of the fundamental lemma of game-playing [9] we have that
procedure Initialize Figure 8 : Games G3, G4, G5, and G6 used in the proof of Lemma 5.1. Game G3 does not include the boxed statements, while G4 includes them.
Game G5 simplifies G4 in light of always answering corruption queries and always outputing a successful forgery by A. These changes do not change the implemented functionality of procedures OCorrupt and Finalize, so Pr [G4(A)
Note that in game G5 anytime bad is set within OCorrupt, necessarily P = K during Finalize. This is because A is legitimate, implying that the set P it outputs does not contain any indices previously queried to OCorrupt. Thus, if bad is set in OCorrupt for an index i ∈ K, then i / ∈ P and so K = P. Game G6 therefore dispenses with the (now redundant) setting of bad in OCorrupt and additionally moves the choice of K to the Finalize procedure (they are no longer used elsewhere in the game). We have already justified that these changes are without loss, thus Pr [G5(A)
. In game G6 we note that, in fact, the events Good 6 and G6(A) ⊥ are independent. Although the setting of bad and G6(A) ⊥ both rely on the adversary's choice of P, the probability that bad is set for any set P is the same, meaning that the event Good 6 is independent of a particular choice of P, and hence of G6(A)
⊥. Thus we have
where the last equation comes from noting that bad is not set if K is chosen to be the set of indices used in the forgery.
Finally we have that G6(A) is equivalent to Exp
. Collecting all the previous game transitions we have that
which, combined with (12), implies the lemma statement. The running times of both B u and B a includes the time to run A plus the overhead associated with setting up the additional public keys and answering oracle queries.
Fixed versus arbitrary ring security. The next lemma states that any κ-user ring signature scheme secure against rogue-key adversaries forging against a particular, fixed ring are also secure against the more general ruf3-kr adversaries. This lemma will be useful for simplifying the proof of Theorem 5.4, but we expect that it is also of independent interest. Lemma 5.2 Let RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) be a κ-user ring signature scheme and let Reg = (RegP, RegV) be a registration protocol. Let η ≥ κ. Let A be an ruf3-kr adversary making at most q s signing queries, at most q c corruption queries, at most q k key registration queries, and running in time at most t. Then there exists an ruf3-kr-fr adversary B such that
Register pk i using OKReg-B Else pk i ← pk j ; I[i] ← j; j ← j + 1 Run A(par, (pk i ) η 1 ), answering queries by: where B runs in time at most t + O(q c + (η + q s )Time(RS)) and uses at most q s signing queries and at most q k + η − κ registration queries.
Proof:
The proof is similar in spirit to the proof of Lemma 5.1. Let A be a legitimate ruf3-kr adversary. We build a legitimate ruf3-kr-fr adversary B that uses A. See Figure 9 . The adversary B is given inputs a parameter string and a ring of size κ that it must forge against. Adversary B has access to a signing oracle denoted by ORSign-B and a key registration oracle OKReg. Here the ORSign-B oracle allows queries on (registered) adversarially-chosen keys, as per the ruf3-kr experiment. Adversary B first selects a set of indices K that represent its guess of which parties will be forged against by A. Then, a new set of keys are generated by B. For every index in K one of the target keys is used. For all others, B generates its own public key, secret key pair and registers it as a rogue key using its OKReg-B oracle. Adversary A is run using the full set of η public keys. The table I is used to map between the indices in the set of public keys given to A and the indices in the set of public keys given to B. Signing queries ORSign-A(s, V, M ) from A are simulated in one of two ways. If the signing key is one of the target keys, then B queries its ORSign-B oracle and returns the result. Otherwise the signing key must be one of those generated by B initially, and so B uses it to generate the requested ring signature. For corruption queries, if the index queried is not in K then the secret key is returned (in this case B knows the secret key). Otherwise ⊥ is returned. Key registration invocations, which aren't explicitly shown in the figure procedure Initialize for brevity, are just forwarded to B's OKReg-B oracle.
We now proceed through a game-playing sequence to lower bound the advantage of B in terms of the advantage of A. Game G0 represents the first game, see Figure 6 . It is equivalent to the adversary B except that it generates the parameter string and honest public keys itself and answers ORSign-A queries with s ∈ K directly via computing RSign. It dispenses with the registration of the public keys it generates, which is no longer necessary since the game now also simulates the environment. Key registration queries made by A are handled by simulating a new instance of RegV (this is not shown in Figure 9 for brevity, nor will it be shown in the rest of the games as it never changes). Since the outputs of G0(A) and B are distributed equivalently and B forges any time it doesn't output ⊥, we have
Game G1 ( Figure 10 , boxed statements omitted) simplifies the Initialize procedure by picking one set of η public keys. This means that the table I is no longer needed, and thus omitted. The ORSign-A oracle is thus written more simply; the new code implements the same functionality as the ORSign-A oracle of G0. The Finalize procedure outputs (P, M, σ) as opposed to ({1, . . . , κ}, M, σ) in G0, but this does not change the probability with which the game outputs ⊥.
We have that
The rest of the game sequence (what would be games G1-G4) is similar to the sequence G3-G6 used in the proof of Lemma 5.1 (except for the implicit key registration oracle), see Figure 8 . We therefore omit the next 4 games and their analysis, which can be easily adapted from the games and analysis in the proof of Lemma 5.1. We conclude that
which combined with (18) and (19) implies the lemma statement. The running time of B is equal to the running time of A plus the overhead of initializing the public keys and answering oracle queries, leading to the time bound given in the lemma statement.
KOSK Improves Unforgeability Guarantees
Using the key registration protocol Kosk, any scheme that is unforgeable with respect to corruption attacks (ruf2) and meets our strong definition of anonymity is also secure against rogue-key attacks (ruf3-kr). Note that this result (unlike those in the last section) applies to any ring signature scheme, not just κ-user ring signature schemes.
Theorem 5.3 Fix η and let RS = (RPg, RKg, RSign, RVf) be a ring signature scheme. Let A be an ruf3 adversary with respect to the Kosk protocol that makes at most q s signature queries, at most q c corruption queries, at most q k registration queries, and runs in time at most t. Then there exist adversaries B a and B u such that
where B a and B u both run in time at most t + O(q k + q c + (q s + η + 1)Time(RS)) and make at most q s sign queries and at most q c corrupt queries.
Before proceeding to the proof we point out that one can apply Lemma 5.1 and then Theorem 5.3 to the two 2-user ring signature schemes from Bender et al., rendering them secure against rogue-key attacks when Kosk is used for key registration. Now we prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof: Let A be a legitimate ruf3 adversary with respect to the Kosk key registration protocol. In this case the key registration oracle registers the public key of any valid (pk, sk) pair queried by A. We can assume without loss of generality that A never queries its registration oracle with a pair (pk, sk) that is not a valid key pair. We specify a legitimate ruf2 adversary B u , shown in Figure 11 , that takes input a parameter string and set of public keys and has access to a ruf2 signing oracle (denoted ORSign-2). It utilizes a table P to record the secret keys registered for adversariallychosen public keys (initially, P is everywhere undefined). Adversary B u runs A and responds to A's signing queries in one of two ways. If all the public keys in the query are ones generated by the environment, then B u uses its ORSign-2 oracle to generate the response. Otherwise, it uses the secret key registered for one of the adversarially-chosen public keys (say, the lexicographically first) to answer the query. Since A is legitimate, any adversarially-chosen public key used in a signing query must first have been registered. Adversary B u is legitimate because A is legitimate and because B u never queries its ORSign-2 oracle with a set of public keys including rogue keys.
We specify a game G0 in Figure 11 which is just like B u , except that it runs the parameter string and the public key, secret key generation algorithms itself and answers ORSign-3 and OCorrupt-3 queries directly. Its output is distributed identically to B u and B u forges anytime its output is not ⊥. Thus
Game G1 combines the Initialize, OCorrupt, OKReg, and Finalize procedures of G0 with the ORSign-3 procedure (labeled G1) shown in Figure 11 . In G1 sk s is always utilized to generate responses to signing queries. To bound the loss due to this change, we build an ranon-ind adversary B a and will relate the difference in the output distributions of G0(A) and G1(A) to the advantage of B a . Figure 11 shows the adversary. It behaves exactly like G0 and G1 except that it utilizes its ORSignLR oracle to respond to some signing queries. By the definition of ranon-ind advantage we have that
Note that if B a is run in the ranon-ind-1 experiment, then the secret key sk s is always utilized to answer B a 's oracle queries. Thus B a returns a one whenever G1(A) would not output ⊥, and so we have that Pr Exp
Similarly, if B a is run in the ranon-ind-0 experiment, then the secret key P[pk] is always used to answer B a 's queries. So Pr Exp
. Substituting back into (21) and re-arranging we have that
The final game is G2, which just simplifies the ORSign-3 oracle from game G1. 
The running time of B u and B a are (each) the running time of A plus the overhead needed to respond to A's oracle queries, leading to the time bounds given in the theorem statement.
Ring Signatures with POPs
For all the reasons already described, we'd like to avoid the KOSK assumption wherever possible. Thus, we give a proof-of-possession based registration protocol for the 2-user scheme based on Waters signatures from Bender et al. [10] . Let G 1 , G 2 , G T , p, g, e be pairing parameters with
be the ring signature scheme defined as below.
When we write (g 1 , u, u) ← pk (resp. (g 1 , u , u ) ← pk ), we mean that pk (resp. pk ) is parsed into its constituent parts. In [10] the scheme is proven secure against ruf1 adversaries and we can apply Theorem 5.1 to show security against ruf2 adversaries. Additionally it is easy to see that the scheme is perfectly ranon-ind. However, as shown in [37] the scheme is not secure against rogue-key attacks (in the plain setting). We now show a simple proof-of-possession based registration protocol under which provable security against rogue-key attacks can be achieved. Choose global parameters (h 0 , h 1 , w, w 1 , . . . , w n ) $ ← (G 1 ) n+3 (this will require trusted setup, since the CA should not know the discrete logs of these values). Then we specify the registration protocol WR-Pop = (WR-PopP, WR-PopV). Algorithm WR-PopP takes as input (pk, sk) and sends pk || (π 0 , 0 , π 1 , 1 ) which is computed by generating the two signatures W-Sign H w, w (h sk 0 , pk n ) and W-Sign H w, w (h sk 1 , pk n ). Algorithm WR-PopV, upon receiving the message, verifies the signatures in the natural way: get g 1 from pk and check that both e(g 1 , h 0 )·e(H w, w ( pk n ), 0 ) = e(π 0 , g) and e(g 1 , h 1 )·e(H w, w ( pk n ), 1 ) = e(π 1 , g). If both signatures verify, the algorithm replies with pk and otherwise ⊥. The following theorem captures the security of WRS with respect to the WR-Pop registration protocol.
Theorem 5.4 Fix η ≥ 2. Let A be an ruf3-kr adversary with respect to the WR-Pop protocol that makes at most q s signature queries, q c corruption queries, q k key registration queries, and runs in time at most t. Then there exists an adversary B such that where B makes at most q s signing queries and runs in time at most t+O(q c +(n+q s +1)Time(WRS).
Proof: In fact we consider an ruf3-kr-fr adversary A (with respect to the WR-Pop protocol), and will later apply Lemma 5.2 to prove the theorem. We use A to build a uf adversary B against the Waters signature scheme; the adversary B is shown in Figure 12 . Adversary B is given input a parameter string and Waters' public key and has access to a Waters' signing oracle OSign. First it parses the parameter string and Waters' public key pk * , notated by the code (g 1 , u, u 1 , . . . , u n ) ← pk * . It generates two WRS public keys. The first, pk * 0 , is composed of g 1 and a set of randomly chosen group elements a, a. The second, pk * 1 , is composed of the Waters' parameter h and a set of group elements b, b chosen to be the Waters' elements u, u component-wise divided by the values a, a. Lastly it generates the public parameters for the WR-Pop protocol, programming the values h 0 and h 1 to include the group elements g 1 and h, respectively. The values w, w are chosen so that the environment knows their discrete logs (base g). The adversary handles A's queries as follows. For key registration, the POP is simply recorded in a table P, which is initially undefined everywhere. Without loss of generality we assume A only sends valid POPs. For signing queries, A will either query on the set of public keys V including both pk * 0 and pk * 1 or at least one of the two (recall that because A is legitimate, it will never query on two keys it chose, and all adversarially-chosen keys queried to ORSign will have been previously registered). If the former, then B uses its signing oracle to generate a response. Otherwise, it utilizes the POP of the adversarially-chosen public key to assist it in computing a response. The code (pk * s , pk) ← V means: (1) parse V as two public keys pk and pk and (2) let s ∈ {0, 1} be such that pk = pk * s . Finally when A finishes, B outputs A's forgery in the case that it verifies and otherwise outputs ⊥.
We now show that if A outputs a successful forgery, then B does also. The forgery is of the form ({pk * 0 , pk * 1 }, M, (σ, ρ)) and if W-RVf verifies then we know that e(g 1 , h)·e(Y, ρ) = e(σ, g) where Y = H a, a (M ) · H b, b (M ). But we have that for any M ∈ {0, 1} n that
Thus σ, ρ are such that W-Vf H u, u (pk * , M, (σ, ρ)) = 1. 
Game G2 simplifies handling of signing queries further. Queries on V = {pk * 0 , pk * 1 } are handled as in game G1. There are two other cases. First if V = {pk * 0 , pk}, the response is computed via W-RSign(α, V, M ). Second if V = {pk * 1 , pk}, the response is computed via W-RSign(δ, V, M ). (Note that δ is the discrete log of h base g, and plays the role of sk * 1 .) We focus on the first case, where s = 0, showing that G1 and G2 implement the same signing functionality when queried by A on V = {pk * 0 , pk} and a message M for some adversarially-chosen public key pk = (ĝ, z, z). (The other case is argued similarly.) In G1 such a query is answered by σ = π 0 · Y r ·ĝ −β 0 · x+ P n j=1 x j pk[j] 0 −1 (26) and a value g r where r $ ← Z p . Since A is legitimate, the POP tuple (π 0 , 0 ) verifies under WR-PopV, meaning that e(π 0 , g) = e(ĝ, h 0 ) · e(H w, w (pk), 0 ) = e(ĝ, g 1 g β 0 ) · e(H w, w (pk), 0 ) = e(ĝ, g 1 ) · e(ĝ, g β 0 ) · e(H w, w (pk), 0 ) (27) and since g 1 = g α the properties of e give that e(ĝ, g 1 ) = e(ĝ α , g). Substituting this into (27) and rearranging gives e(ĝ α , g) = e(π 0 , g) e(ĝ, g β 0 ) · e(H w, w (pk), 0 ) = e(π 0 , g) e(ĝ, g β 0 ) · e(g x+
Above we have utilized the properties of e to derive the chain of equalities. Equation (28) gives thatĝ
and substituting (29) into ( 
In game G3, we further simplify the ORSign procedure, always returning exactly the ring signature requested by A. Since WRS is perfectly ranon-ind anonymous there is no distinction between the handling of signing queries in G2 and in G3. Thus,
In the final game G4 we re-write the Initialize procedure, computing values as shown in Figure 14 . The distributions of the variables returned by the procedure remain unchanged, giving that
Now however we note that G4 exactly implements the ruf3-kr-fr experiment with respect to the WR-Pop protocol. 
